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Abstract
In this paper we use some ideas of Cornet and de Boisdeffre to
study the concept of arbitrage under asymmetric information. The
mathematical framework is a separable probability space where the
agents’ information are represented by σ-algebras. In this setting we
formulate some versions of the fundamental theorem of asset pricing
(aka the Dalang-Morton-Willinger theorem) for the case of asymmetric
information. We also study the revealing properties of no-arbitrage
prices and prove that the results of Cornet and de Boisdeffre hold in a
more general setting.
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1 Introduction
In markets subject to asymmetric information, agents will use asset prices
to extract information. This is the basis of rational expectations models
where the agents use their knowledge of the other agents’ characteristics
and the observed market prices to update their own probability assessments
(cf. e.g. [9]). An alternative approach, suggested in [3] is to assume that
agents extract information from asset prices only by analysing arbitrage op-
portunities. Contrary to rational expectations models the agents need no a
priori knowledge of the other agents’ preferences or behaviour.
The scope of [3] is firstly to extend the concept of arbitrage to the case of
asymmetric information and secondly to study how no-arbitrage prices re-
veal information. In the follow-up paper [4], the authors study how agents
can extract information by successively ruling out ”arbitrage states” i.e.
states in which an arbitrage opportunity would give a strictly positive pay-
off. The existence of a no-arbitrage equilibrium in a market with asymmetric
information is dealt with in [6]. Extensions to the multiperiod case are stud-
ied in [1]. All these papers are limited to a finite dimensional state space,
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and the agents’ information are represented by subsets of the state space
(sub-trees in the multiperiod case).
The aim of this paper is to use the ideas from [3] in a more mathematically
profound analysis of a financial market. Our framework will be a sepa-
rable probability space and the agents’ information will be represented by
σ-algebras (filtrations in the multiperiod case). In this framework we can
formulate some ”asymmetric information versions” of the fundamental theo-
rem of asset pricing (aka the Dalang-Morton-Willinger theorem). As we will
see, the results of [3] and [4] hold true in a more general setting. Hopefully,
the added mathematical sophistication will enable us to use the powerful
tools of mathematical finance for further analysis of the multiperiod (briefly
discussed in this paper) and continuous time markets. The issue of existence
of a no-arbitrage equilibrium is not dealt with in this paper.
The paper is organised as follows: In Section 2 we introduce information
structures and arbitrages in an asymmetric information setting and state
some versions of the fundamental theorem of asset pricing. We will see that
some information structures do not allow no-arbitrage prices. In Section 3 we
introduce the concept of arbitrage-free refinements of information structures.
We discuss whether informational asymmetries can prevail in an arbitrage-
free market and find that this issue is linked to market completeness. Section
4 deals with information revealed by prices. In Section 5 we study how agents
can extract information from prices by analysing arbitrage opportunities. In
Section 6 we briefly discuss the extension to the multiperiod market.
2 Information and arbitrage
2.1 Framework and notation
Consider the complete probability space (Ω,F , P ). We assume that F is
separable. There are J assets in the economy, traded at time 0, with the
F-measurable RJ -valued time T payoff V. We assume that F is generated
by V . A portfolio is a (possibly random) J-dimensional vector whose com-
ponents denote the holdings of the assets, the payoff of the portfolio z is
the random variable V ⊤z. A price function is an F-measurable RJ -valued
random variable.
Assumption 2.1. V is bounded and there exist some portfolio z∗ ∈ RJ such
that V ⊤z∗ > 0 a.s. and V
V ⊤z∗
is integrable.
An agent’s information will be represented by a σ-algebra G ⊆ F .We assume
all σ-algebras to be completed. For any σ-algebra G ⊆ F we let P (·|G)
denote the regular version of the conditional probability (cf. [2, Section 33]).
The separability of G ensures that for any ω ∈ Ω and F ∈ F the smallest
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elements in G that contains ω or F are well-defined as
G(ω,G) :=
⋂
G∈G,
ω∈G
G, G(F,G) :=
⋂
G∈G,
F⊆G
G.
An information structure is a collection (Hi) := (H1, . . . ,HI) of σ-algebras
representing the agents’ information. The agents’ pooled information is given
by the join
H : =
∨
Hi,
while their common information is given by the meet
H : =
∧
Hi.
We can also define the meet of a sequence (G
(1)
i ), (G
(2)
i ), . . . of information
structures as
(
∧
k=1,2... G
(k)
i ).
The information structure (Hi) is symmetric if all the Hi’s coincide. The
information structure (Gi) is a refinement of (Hi) if Hi ⊆ Gi for all i, we also
say that (Hi) is coarser than (Gi). Clearly for any refinement (Gi), H ⊆ G.
The refinement is self-attainable if H = G.
Remark 2.1. In our notation, all the analysis in [3] take place on some fixed
ω ∈ Ω and agent i’s information is represented by G(ω,Hi).
2.2 Arbitrage-free information structures
Definition 2.1 (arbitrage, arbitrage-free σ-algebras and no-arbitrage price
functions). Given the price function φ, a vector z ∈ RJ is a φ-arbitrage
for the σ-algebra G ⊆ F at ω if
φ(ω)⊤z ≤ 0, V ⊤z ≥ 0P (·|G)(ω)-a.s. and P (V ⊤z > 0|G)(ω) > 0.
(2.1)
The price function φ is a no-arbitrage price function for G and G is φ-
arbitrage-free if G is φ-arbitrage-free at ω for any ω outside a set of measure
0. The set of no-arbitrage price functions for G is denoted Φ(G).
Remark 2.2. Strictly speaking we should also refer to V in the definition
and say that G is φ-arbitrage-free for V and that φ is a no-arbitrage price
for V and G etc. But in the one-period market, V is fixed and we need not
refer to it untill we treat the multiperiod market.
Remark 2.3. Note that we do not assume that the price function is G-
measurable. This may seem odd when thinking of G as the agent’s informa-
tion: clearly the agent will observe the asset prices. But as the asset prices
can depend on information that is not available to the agent we cannot
assume that the asset price as a mapping φ : Ω→ RJ is G-measurable.
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Remark 2.4. For the case of a G-measurable price function the property of
no-arbitrage in Definition 2.1 coincides with the standard definition, namely
that there is no G-measurable RJ -valued random variable ξ such that
φ⊤ξ ≤ 0, V ⊤ξ ≥ 0P -a.s. and P (V ⊤z > 0) > 0.
For a proof, see [5, Lemma 2.3].
The following theorem, which corresponds to the equivalence statement in
[3, Definition 2.2], is a version of the fundamental theorem of asset pricing
(cf. e.g. [8, Theorem 1.6]):
Theorem 2.1. The price function φ is a no-arbitrage price function for G
if and only if for almost all ω there exist some probability measure P (0) ∼ P
on (Ω,F) such that
φ(ω)
φ(ω)⊤z∗
= E(0)
[ V
V ⊤z∗
∣∣G](ω). (2.2)
Proof. Fix some ω and put φ(ω) = q. The absence of arbitrage implies
that q⊤z∗ > 0 so that the representation (2.2) is well-defined. It is easy to
see that this representation implies absence of arbitrage. For the converse,
consider
C :=
{
E(0)
[ V
V ⊤z∗
∣∣G](ω)− q
q⊤z∗
; P (0) ∼ P
}
⊆ RJ .
Clearly, (2.2) holds if and only if 0 ∈ C. If 0 6∈ C, then by the separating
hyperplane theorem (e.g. [8, Proposition A.1]) there exist some ζ ∈ RJ such
that
x⊤ζ ≥ 0, for all x ∈ C (2.3a)
and
x⊤0 ζ > 0, for some x0 ∈ C. (2.3b)
Consequently
V ⊤ζ
V ⊤z∗
≥
q⊤ζ
q⊤z∗
P (·|G)(ω)-a.s.
and
P
( V ⊤ζ
V ⊤z∗
>
q⊤ζ
q⊤z∗
∣∣G)(ω) > 0.
Hence,
z :=


q⊤ζ
q⊤ζ−q⊤z∗
z∗ − q
⊤z∗
q⊤ζ−q⊤z∗
ζ, q⊤ζ < q⊤z∗,
ζ − z∗, q⊤ζ = q⊤z∗,
− q
⊤ζ
q⊤ζ−q⊤z∗
z∗ + q
⊤z∗
q⊤ζ−q⊤z∗
ζ, q⊤ζ > q⊤z∗
represents a φ-arbitrage at ω.
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As a direct consequence we have that:
Corollary 2.1.1. For every σ-algebra G, there exist some G-measurable
no-arbitrage price function.
Later on we will need the following even stronger result:
Lemma 2.1. If φ ∈ Φ(G) then for any F ′ ⊇ G we have that E[φ|F ′] ∈ Φ(G).
Proof. Suppose not and let z be an arbitrage for E[φ|F ′] at ω, i.e.
E[φ|F ′](ω)⊤z ≤ 0, (2.4)
V ⊤z ≥ 0P (·|G)(ω)-a.s. and P (V ⊤z > 0|G)(ω) > 0. (2.5)
As φ is a no-arbitrage price function, (2.5) implies that φ(ω)⊤z > 0. For
(2.4) to hold we must have that for any F ∈ F ′ containing ω there must be
some F ′ ⊂ F such that P (F ′) > 0 and φ⊤z < 0 on F ′. By (2.5) there must
be some G ∈ G containing ω such that V ⊤z ≥ 0 on G. As G ⊆ F ′, G ∈ F ′
and there must be some G′ ⊂ G such that P (G′) > 0 and φ⊤z < 0 on G′.
Hence φ cannot be a no-arbitrage price function for G at ω.
Absence of arbitrage can also be defined for information structures:
Definition 2.2 (common no-arbitrage price function, arbitrage-free infor-
mation structure). The price function φ is a common no-arbitrage price
function for (Hi) and (Hi) is φ-arbitrage-free if all the Hi’s are φ-arbitrage-
free. The set of common no-arbitrage price functions for (Hi) is denoted
Φc((Hi)) :=
⋂
Φ(Hi).
(Hi) is arbitrage-free if there exist some common no-arbitrage price function,
i.e. Φc((Hi)) 6= ∅.
Note that the concept of an arbitrage-free information structure has no
counterpart in Definition 2.1, because one can always find some no-arbitrage
prices for any σ-algebra (cf. Corollary 2.1.1). These may not coincide for
different σ-algebras, but clearly as in [3, Proposition 2.1]:
Corollary 2.1.2. Any symmetric information structure is arbitrage-free.
As a direct consequence of Theorem 2.1 we have an ”asymmetric information
version” of the fundamental theorem of asset pricing:
Corollary 2.1.3. The price function φ is a common no-arbitrage price func-
tion for (Hi) if and only if for almost all ω, there exist some collection of
measures P (1), . . . , P (I) ∼ P such that
φ(ω)
φ(ω)⊤z∗
= E(i)
[ V
V ⊤z∗
∣∣Hi](ω), i = 1, . . . , I.
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It would be natural to assume that asset prices are H-measurable. As the
following result shows, this does not affect the existence of common no-
arbitrage price functions.
Proposition 2.1. If there exists some common no-arbitrage price function
for (Hi), there exists some H-measurable common no-arbitrage price func-
tion for (Hi).
Proof. By Lemma 2.1, if φ ∈ Φc((Hi)), then E[φ|H] ∈ Φc((Hi)).
Example 2.1 (cf. Section 2.3 [3]). Suppose I = 2, J = 3, F := σ{F1, . . . , F4},
V (ω) :=


[
−1 0 0
]⊤
, ω ∈ F1,[
1 1 0
]⊤
, ω ∈ F2,[
0 0 1
]⊤
, ω ∈ F3,[
0 1 0
]⊤
, ω ∈ F4,
and
H1 := σ{F4} and H2 := σ{F3}.
Then
Φ(H1) =
{[
p1 p2 p3
]⊤
χFC4
+
[
0 q2 0
]⊤
χF4;
p1 < p2, p2 > 0, p3 > 0, q2 > 0
}
,
Φ(H2) =
{[
p1 p2 0
]⊤
χFC3
+
[
0 0 q3
]⊤
χF3 ; p1 < p2, p2 > 0, q3 > 0
}
.
Hence
Φc((H1,H2)) = ∅.
2.3 Future arbitrages
An alternative approach to arbitrage, not dealing explicitly with asset prices,
is the following:
Definition 2.3 (future arbitrage opportunity). An allocation (z(i)) ∈ (RJ)I
is a future arbitrage opportunity for (Gi) at ω if∑
z(i) = 0, (2.6a)
V ⊤z(i) ≥ 0 P (·|Hi)(ω)-a.s. for all i = 1, . . . , I (2.6b)
and
P (V ⊤z(j) > 0|Hj)(ω) > 0 for some j ∈ {1, . . . , I}. (2.6c)
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The two arbitrage concepts are related:
Proposition 2.2. The information structure (Hi) is arbitrage-free if and
only if there are no future arbitrage opportunities for (Hi) at any ω outside
a set of measure 0.
Proof. Using Theorem 2.1, it is easily seen that absence of arbitrage ensures
that there are no future arbitrage opportunities. Conversely, fix ω and
consider
C :=
{{
E(i)
[ V
V ⊤z∗
∣∣Hi](ω)− E(I)[ V
V ⊤z∗
∣∣HI](ω); i = 1. . . . , I − 1
}
;
P (j) ∼ P, j = 1, . . . , I
}
⊆ RJ(I−1).
Clearly (Hi) is arbitrage-free at ω if and only if 0 ∈ C. By the separating
hyperplane theorem, if 0 6∈ C, there exists some ζ ∈ RJ(I−1) such that
(2.3) hold. Hence there exist some collection ζ(1), . . . , ζ(I−1) ∈ RJ and some
x ∈ RI−1 such that
V ⊤ζ(i)
V ⊤z∗
≥ xi P (·|Hi)(ω)-a.s. and
V ⊤ζ(i)
V ⊤z∗
≤ xi P (·|HI)(ω)-a.s.
for all i = 1, . . . , I − 1 and for some j ∈ 1, . . . I − 1
P
(V ⊤ζ(j)
V ⊤z∗
> xj
∣∣Hj)(ω) > 0 or P(V ⊤ζ(j)
V ⊤z∗
< xi
∣∣HI)(ω) > 0.
In any case, taking
z(j) :=


1
1−xj
ζ(j) −
xj
1−xj
z∗, xj < 1,
ζ(j) − z∗, xj = 1,
− 11−xj ζ
(j) +
xj
1−xj
z∗, xj > 1,
z(I) = −z(j) and all other portfolios 0 results in a future arbitrage at ω.
Example 2.1 (continued) The allocation
z(1) :=
[
0 0 1
]
=: −z(2)
is a future arbitrage opportunity on F1 ∪ F2. While
z(1) :=
[
−1 1 0
]
=: −z(2)
is a future arbitrage opportunity on F3.
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3 Arbitrage-free refinements
If the refinement (Gi) of the information structure (Hi) is arbitrage free, we
refer to (Gi) as an arbitrage-free refinement of (Hi). Clearly, by Corollary
2.1.2 the pooled refinement, where Gi = H for all i is arbitrage-free and self-
attainable. But as the following example shows, the agents do not necessarily
have to share all their information to find a no-arbitrage price.
Example 2.1 (continued) The information structure
G1 := H1
∨
H2 = σ{F3, F4},
G2 := H2 = σ{F3},
is clearly a self-attainable refinement of (H1,H2). We have
Φ(G1) =
{ [
p1 p2 0
]⊤
χF1∪F2 +
[
0 0 q3
]⊤
χF3 +
[
0 r2 0
]⊤
χF4;
p1 < p2, p2 > 0, q3 > 0, r2 > 0
}
and
Φ(G2) ≡ Φ(H2) ⊃ Φ(G1).
Hence,
Φc((G1,G2)) = Φ(G1).
Proposition 3.1. For any information structure there exists a unique coars-
est refinement that is arbitrage-free. Moreover, this refinement is self-attainable.
To prove this we proceed as in the proof of [3, Proposition 3.2].
Lemma 3.1. The meet of a countable sequence of self-attainable arbitrage-
free refinements of an information structure is also a self-attainable arbitrage-
free refinement.
Proof. The meet is clearly a self-attainable refinement. The meet of a count-
able sequence of σ-algebras or information strucures can be formed by suc-
cessively taking the meet of two σ-algebras or information structures. Hence
it is sufficient to prove that if (G
(1)
i ) and (G
(2)
i ) are arbitrage-free, then so is
(Gi) defined by
Gi := G
(1)
i
∧
G
(2)
i , i = 1, . . . , I.
Suppose that (Gi) is not arbitrage-free on ω and let (z
(i)) be an allocation
such that (2.6) hold. Defining
F :=
{
ω′ ∈ G(ω,Gj); V (ω
′)⊤z(j) > 0
}
,
we have that P (F ) > 0. Clearly
V ⊤z(i) ≡ 0 P (·|G
(k)
i )(ω0)-a.s. for all i, k = 1, 2,
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as (G
(1)
i ) and (G
(2)
i ) are arbitrage-free. Hence
ω 6∈ G(F,G
(k)
j ), k = 1, 2.
IfG(F,G
(1)
j ) andG(F,G
(2)
j ) coincide they would be Gj-measurable and would
not be contained in G(ω,Gj). Hence the sets cannot coincide, and by the
same argument
G(F,G
(1)
j ) 6∈ G
(2)
j and G(F,G
(2)
j ) 6∈ G
(1)
j .
Hence
G(ω,Gj)
⋂
G(F,G
(1)
j )
C 6∈ G
(2)
j (3.1a)
and
G(ω,Gj)
⋂
G(F,G
(2)
j )
C 6∈ G
(1)
j . (3.1b)
Recall that (G
(1)
i ) and (G
(2)
i ) have the same pooled information, i.e. G
(1) =
G(2). Hence by (3.1)
G(ω,Gj)
⋂
G(F,G
(1)
j )
C ∈ G
(2)
i , for some i 6= j (3.2a)
and
G(ω,Gj)
⋂
G(F,G
(2)
j )
C ∈ G
(1)
i , for some i 6= j. (3.2b)
Without loss of generality we assume that
F ′ := G(F,G
(1)
j )
⋂
G(F,G
(2)
j )
C
(shaded area in Figure 1) is non-empty, and as F ′ 6∈ G
(1)
j we must have that
P (F ′) > 0, by completeness. Clearly V ⊤z(j) ≡ 0 on F ′, but we also have
that
P (V ⊤z(j) > 0|G
(1)
j )(ω
′) > 0, ω′ ∈ F ′.
However, by (3.2b) we have
V ⊤z(j) ≡ 0, P (·|G
(1)
i )(ω
′)-a.s. for some i 6= j.
Hence the allocation zˆ with zˆ(j) = z(j) = −zˆ(i) and all other elements 0 is a
future arbitrage opportunity for (G
(1)
i ) on F
′, which is a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 3.1. Since the pooled refinement is self-attainable and
arbitrage-free, the set of self-attainable arbitrage-free refinements is non-
empty. By Lemma 3.1 the clearly unique meet of all the arbitrage-free
refinements is itself a self-attainable and arbitrage-free refinement.
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× ω
G
(
F,G
(1)
j
)
G
(
F,G
(2)
j
)
G(ω,Gj)
F F ′
Figure 1
If the agents have to share all their information to reach an arbitrage-free
information structure, we say that the information structure is revealing (cf.
[3, Definition 3.1]):
Definition 3.1 (full revelation). An information structure is fully revealing
if every self-attainable arbitrage-free refinement is symmetric.
Remark 3.1. The assertion in Definition 3.1 is equivalent to
• the coarsest arbitrage-free refinement is symmetric
• the pooled refinement and the coarsest arbitrage-free refinement coin-
cide
As we shall see, the revealing properties of an information structure is linked
to market completeness.
Definition 3.2 (contingent claims, attainable claims, completeness). A con-
tingent F-claim is a nonnegative and finite-valued random variable X on
(Ω,F , P ). Such a claim is attainable for the σ-algebra G ⊆ F if there exists
some G-measurable portfolio z such that
V ⊤z = X a.s. (3.3)
We say that the market {(Ω,F , P ), V } is complete for G if every contingent
F-claim is attainable for G.
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As F is separable it suffices that for every F ∈ F there exists some (G-
measurable) z such that
V ⊤z = χF a.s. (3.4)
for the market to be complete.
Lemma 3.2. If for any F ∈ F there exists some G-measurable portfolio z
such that V ⊤z ≡ 0 on FC and V ⊤z > 0 on F , the market {(Ω,F , P ), V } is
complete for G.
Proof. Suppose that for any n;Fn1, . . . , FnKn is a partition of F ∈ F , i.e.
F
Kn⊔
k=1
Fnk,
that any Fnk is the (disjoint) union of sets of the form F(n+1)·, that F = F11
and that
{Fnk; k = 1, . . . ,Kn, n = 1, 2. . . .}
generates the restriction of F to F . Suppose moreover that V ⊤znk ≡ 0 on
FCnk and V
⊤znk > 0 on Fnk and that
sup
Fnk
V ⊤znk = 1.
Define z as the limit of the recursive scheme
z1 := z11,
zn := zn−1 +
Kn∑
k=1
xnkznk, n > 1
where
xnk := 1− sup
Fnk
V ⊤zn−1.
Clearly V ≡ 0 on FC and V ⊤z ≤ 1 on F . Moreover, if V ⊤z(ω) < 1 for some
ω ∈ F , we must have that for all sets in F ′ ∈ F containing ω there must
be some ω′ ∈ F ′ such that V ⊤z(ω′) = 1 , which is clearly a contradiction.
Hence (3.4) holds.
Example 3.1 Suppose I = 2, J = 2, F := σ{F1, F2, F3} with
V (ω) :=


[
1 0
]⊤
, ω ∈ F1,[
0 1
]⊤
, ω ∈ F2,[
1 1
]⊤
, ω ∈ F3.
(3.5)
This market is complete for any σ-algebra generated by any one of the sets.
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Not surprisingly, in complete markets information structures are revealing
(cf. [3, Proposition 3.3]):
Proposition 3.2. The following are equivalent
A. The market {(Ω,F , P ), V } is complete for G.
B. Any arbitrage-free information structure (Gi) with Gi ⊇ G for all i is
symmetric.
Proof.
• A =⇒ B
Let (Gi) be an asymmetric information structure. Then there must
exist some F ∈ F , i, j such that F ∈ Gi but F 6∈ Gj . By completeness,
there exist some G-measurable z such that V ⊤z = χF . But then the
allocation z(j) = z, z(i) = −z and the other z(·)’s zero constitutes a
future arbitrage on G(F,Gj)\F . Hence (Gi) cannot be arbitrage-free.
• B =⇒ A
If B holds then for any F ∈ F , F 6∈ G there is some z ∈ RJ such that
V ⊤z ≡ 0 on G(F,G)\F and V ⊤z > 0 on F , but then, by Lemma 3.2,
the market must be complete.
Corollary 3.2.1. An information structure (Hi) is fully revealing if the
market is complete for the agents’ common information.
As Example 3.2 shows, an information structure need not be fully revealing
even if the market is complete for every agent.
Example 3.2 Suppose I = 2, J = 2, F := σ{F1, . . . , F4} with
V (ω) :=


[
1 0
]⊤
, ω ∈ F1,[
2 0
]⊤
, ω ∈ F2,[
0 1
]⊤
, ω ∈ F3,[
1 1
]⊤
, ω ∈ F4.
For the information structure
H1 := σ{F1 ∪ F3}, H2 := σ{F2 ∪ F3},
the common information is the trivial σ-algebra for which the market is not
complete. Any price vector φ with φ1 > φ2 > 0 a.s. belongs to Φc(H1,H2).
Hence the information structure is not fully revealing.
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3.1 Informed vs uninformed agents
Suppose that there are two types of agents in the market: informed agents
whose information is represented by the σ-algebra G(i) and uninformed
agents whose information is represented by G(u) ( G(i). It is then natu-
ral to ask whether such asymmetries can prevail in a no-arbitrage setting.
Corollary 3.2.1 gives a necessary but not sufficient condition for the pos-
sibility of having non-revealing arbitrage-free information structures. The
following proposition establish a necessary and sufficient condition the pos-
sibility of having an arbitrage-free information structure with informed and
uninformed agents.
Proposition 3.3. The information structure (G(i),G(u)) is arbitrage-free if
and only if for every H ∈ G(i) there exists some probability measure µ ∼ P
on (Ω,F) such that ∫
H
V dµ =
∫
G(H,G(u))\H
V dµ. (3.6)
Example 3.3 Suppose that F and V is as in Example 3.1 and that the
uninformed agents have access to the trivial σ-algebra only. Hence the
market is not complete for the common information. If G(i) is either σ{F1} or
σ{F2} the information structure is revealing, because there is no probability
measure µ ∼ P such that (3.6) holds if H = F1 or H = F2. If µ(F1) =
µ(F2) = µ(F3) =
1
3 , then (3.6) holds for H = F3. Hence if G
(i) = σ{F3},
the information structure is arbitrage-free. In this case any price function
of the form
φ := q0
[
1
1
]
χF3 +
[
q1
q2
]
χF1∪F2,
with all the q’s positive is a common no-arbitrage price.
For the proof of Proposition 3.3 the following lemmas will be useful.
Lemma 3.3. Suppose that (G,G0) with G0 ⊆ G ⊆ F is arbitrage-free and
that G0 ⊆ G
′ ⊆ G then (G′,G0) is arbitrage-free.
Proof. Suppose that (G′,G0) is not arbitrage-free at ω0, then by Proposition
2.2 there is a future arbitrage opportunity, i.e. some z ∈ RJ such that
V ⊤z ≤ 0 P (·|G′)(ω0)-a.s, (3.7a)
V ⊤z ≥ 0 P (·|G0)(ω0)-a.s (3.7b)
and
P (V ⊤z < 0|G′)(ω0) > 0 (3.8a)
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or
P (V ⊤z > 0|G0)(ω0) > 0. (3.8b)
As (3.7b) rules out (3.8a), (3.8b) must hold. Further, (3.7a) implies
V ⊤z ≤ 0 P (·|G)(ω0)-a.s
i.e. (−z, z) is a future arbitrage opportunity for (G,G0) at ω0.
Lemma 3.4. The information structure (G(i),G(u)) is arbitrage-free if and
only if (G(u)
∨
σ{H},G(u)) is arbitrage-free for any H ∈ G(i).
Proof. The ”only if” part is a trivial consequence of Lemma 3.3. Suppose
that (G(i),G(u)) is not arbitrage-free at ω0. Then, by the same arguments as
in the proof of Lemma 3.3 there exists some z ∈ RJ such that
V ⊤z ≤ 0 P (·|G(i))(ω0)-a.s,
V ⊤z ≥ 0 P (·|G(u))(ω0)-a.s
and
P (V ⊤z > 0|G(u))(ω0) > 0.
But then (−z, z) is a future arbitrage opportunity for (G(u)
∨
σ{G(ω0,G
(i))},G(u))
at ω0.
Proof of Proposition 3.3. The ”only if” part stems from the fundamental
theorem. For the ”if” part it is by Lemma 3.4 sufficient to prove that
(G(u)
∨
σ{H},G(u)) is arbitrage-free for any H ∈ G(i). Suppose φ ∈ Φ(G(u))
and define φˆ ≡ φ on G(H,G(u))C and
φˆ(ω) =
∫
H
V dµ, ω ∈ G(H,G(u))
By (3.6), φˆ ∈ Φc(G
(u)
∨
σ{H},G(u)) and (G(u)
∨
σ{H},G(u)) is arbitrage-
free.
3.2 No-arbitrage equilibrium
We now equip every agent i with a strictly increasing utility function Ui :
R→ R and consider the economy
E := {V, (Hi), (Ui)}.
This is a simplification of the economy considered in [3, Section 2.4] which
includes consumption goods, spot prices and endowments.
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Definition 3.3. A collection {(Gi), (z
(i)), φ}, where Gi ⊆ F and z
(i) : Ω→
RJ is F-measurable for all i and φ is a price function, constitutes a no-
arbitrage equilibrium for the economy E if
• (Gi) is a self-attainable refinement of (Hi)
• for all i and almost all ω, z(i)(ω) solves
max
z∈RJ
E[Ui(V
⊤z)|Gi](ω) subject to φ(ω)
⊤z ≤ 0 (3.9)
•
∑
z(i) = 0
The following proposition states that an equilibrium price must be a common
no-arbitrage price function (cf. [3, Proposition 2.2.]):
Proposition 3.4. If there is a solution to (3.9) for every agent, then φ ∈
Φc((Gi)).
Proof. If φ 6∈ Φc((Gi)), then for at least one F ∈ F and one agent i, there
exists some arbitrage opportunity such that (3.9) has no solution.
4 Information revealed by prices
We now proceed to study the revealing properties of price functions. The
following result is in some sense an analogy of Proposition 3.1 as it deals
with the existence of a unique coarsest arbitrage-free σ-algebra for a given
price function (cf. [3, Lemma 2 and Definition 4.1]).
Proposition 4.1. Suppose that φ ∈ Φ(F ′) for some F ′ ⊆ F , then for any
σ-algebra H ⊆ F ′ there is a unique coarsest σ-algebra G ⊇ H such that
φ ∈ Φ(G). This σ-algebra is referred to as the σ-algebra revealed by φ and
denoted by S(φ,H).
As for Proposition 3.1 the proof is simple once we have established the
following:
Lemma 4.1. Consider a sequence of σ-algebras and suppose that φ is a
no-arbitrage price function for each of them. Then φ is also a no-arbitrage
price function for their meet.
Proof. As in the proof of Lemma 3.1 it suffices to prove that if φ ∈ Φ(G(1))∩
Φ(G(2)) then φ ∈ Φ(G) with G := G(1)
∧
G(2). Conversely, suppose that G is
not φ-arbitrage-free at ω and z ∈ RJ is such that (2.1) holds. Define
F := {ω′ ∈ G(ω,G); V ⊤z > 0},
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and note that P (F ) > 0. The no-arbitrage condition, however, implies that
P (F |G(k))(ω) = 0, k = 1, 2.
Hence ω does not belong to any of the G(F,G(k))’s. As argued in the proof of
Lemma 3.1 these sets cannot coincide and we may without loss of generality
assume that
F ′ := G(F,G(1)) ∩G(F,G(2))C
is non-empty. Then for any ω′ ∈ F ′ we have that
V ⊤z ≥ 0 P (·|G(1))(ω′)-a.s., P (V ⊤z > 0|G(1))(ω′) > 0
and
V ⊤z = 0 P (·|G(2))(ω′)-a.s.
But then z(1) := z =: −z(2) is a future arbitrage for the information structure
(G(1),G(2)) on F ′ implying that Φc((G
(1),G(2))) = ∅.
Proof of Proposition 4.1. By assumption the set of φ-arbitrage-free σ-algebras
G ⊇ H is non-empty. By Lemma 4.1 the clearly unique meet is also φ-
arbitrage-free.
Definition 4.1 (no-arbitrage price function). The H-measurable function
φ : Ω→ RJ is a no-arbitrage price function for (Hi), denoted φ ∈ Φ0((Hi)) if
φ is a common no-arbitrage price function for some self-attainable refinement
of (Hi).
Remark 4.1. Clearly, by Corollary 2.1.2 Φ0((Hi)) 6= ∅. We also have that
φ ∈ Φ(H) =⇒ φ ∈ Φ0((Hi)).
The reverse implication holds if the market is complete for the common
information. But it does not hold in general. As pointed out in Example
3.2, any price φ with φ1 > φ2 > 0 a.s. is a common no-arbitrage price for
(H1,H2) but is not necessarily a no-arbitrage price for the pooled informa-
tion H = F .
The following result is the analogue of [3, Proposition 4.2]:
Proposition 4.2. Given some information structure (Hi) and price func-
tion φ the following are equivalent
A. φ ∈ Φ0((Hi))
B. S(φ,Hi) exists and S(φ,Hi) ⊆ H for all i = 1, . . . , I.
C. (S(φ,Hi)) is the coarsest self-attainable refinement of (Hi) that is φ-
arbitrage-free.
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Proof.
• A =⇒ B
By A there exists some self-attainable arbitrage-free refinement (Gi),
i.e. φ ∈ Φc((Gi)). By Proposition 4.1
S(φ,Hi) ⊆ Gi ⊆ G = H, i = 1, . . . , I.
• B =⇒ C
The refinement (S(φ,Hi))) is by the definition the coarsest φ-arbitrage-
free refinement and it is self-attainable by B.
• C =⇒ A
Obvious
These observations motivate the following (cf. [3, Definition 4.3, Proposition
4.4]):
Definition 4.2. The refinement (S(φ,Hi)) is referred to as the refinement
revealed by φ. A self-attainable arbitrage-free refinement (Gi) of (Hi) is price-
revealable if there is some price function φ ∈ Φ0((Hi)) such that for every
i, Gi = S(φ,Hi).
Not all self-attainable arbitrage-free refinements are price-revealable (cf. Ex-
ample 4.1 below), but the coarsest arbitrage-free refinement is (cf. [3, Propo-
sition 4.3]):
Proposition 4.3. The coarsest arbitrage-free refinement of an information
structure is price-revealable.
Proof. Let (Gi) be the coarsest arbitrage-free refinement of the information
structure (Hi) and suppose that φ ∈ Φc((Gi)). Clearly φ ∈ Φ0((Hi)), and by
Proposition 4.2
S(φ,Hi) ⊆ Gi, i = 1, . . . , I.
But as (Gi) is the coarsest arbitrage-free refinement of (Hi), we must also
have that
S(φ,Hi) ⊇ Gi, i = 1, . . . , I,
i.e.
S(φ,Hi) = Gi, i = 1, . . . , I.
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Example 4.1 Suppose I = 2, J = 2 and F and V are as in Example 3.2,
and consider the information structure(
σ{F1}, σ{F1 ∪ F2)}
)
.
In this case the coarsest arbitrage free refinement is(
σ{F1, F2}, σ{F1 ∪ F2)}
)
.
The pooled refinement is not price revealable, because there is no price that
will enable agent 2 to distinguish between F1 and F2.
5 Reaching an arbitrage free refinement
The follow-up paper [4], analyses how it is possible to reach an arbitrage-free
refinement by successively eliminating ”arbitrage states”. In this framework
we define arbitrage sets as sets on which an arbitrage opportunity gives a
strictly positive payoff:
Definition 5.1. Given the sets F ⊆ G ∈ F and price function φ, we say
that F ′ ∈ F such that F ′ ∈ G\F is a (φ, F )-arbitrage set in G if there exists
some z ∈ RJ such that
φ⊤z ≤ 0 on F, V ⊤z ≥ 0 on G, and V ⊤z > 0 on F ′ a.s.
The union of all such sets is denoted A(φ, F,G).
Clearly, there are no (φ, F )-arbitrage sets in G(F,G) for any F ∈ F if and
only if G is φ-arbitrage-free. Noting that G\A(φ, F,G) could still contain
some (φ, F )-arbitrage sets, we define recursively
G(0)(F ) := G(F,G),
G(k)(F ) := G(k−1)(F )\A(φ, F,G(k−1)(F )), k = 1, 2, . . .
with the limit
G∗(F ) :=
⋂
k=0,1,...
G(k)(F ).
A similar approach where only some of the arbitrage sets are removed at
each step is proved to produce the same result. ([4, Theorem 1]). Though
the proof is only stated for the finite case, it also holds in our setting. The
following result links the σ-algebra generated by this procedure to the σ-
algebra revealed by φ (cf. [4, Theorem 2]):
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Theorem 5.1. Suppose φ ∈ Φ(F ′) for some F ′ ⊇ G. Then
S∗ := σ{G∗(F );F ∈ F}
coincides with the σ-algebra revealed by φ.
Proof. We first prove that S∗ is φ-arbitrage free. Suppose z ∈ RJ is an
arbitrage portfolio for S∗ at ω. The existence of an arbitrage-free F ′ ensures
that A
(
φ,G(ω,F), G(ω,S∗)
)
is non-empty, which is a contradiction. Hence
S∗ is φ-arbitrage-free, and accordingly
S(φ,G) ⊆ S∗.
Suppose now that there is some G ∈ S∗ such that G 6∈ S(φ,G) . Then
there exists some F ′ ⊆ G(G,S(φ,G))\G that is in A(φ, F,G′) for some
F ∈ F and some G′ ⊇ G(G,S(φ,G)). Hence S(φ,G) is not arbitrage-free, a
contradiction.
A similar procedure, where ”future arbitrage sets”, defined as sets on which
a future arbitrage opportunity yields a strictly positive payoff for the agent,
are successively removed, will produce the coarsest arbitrage-free refinement
for some information structure (cf. [4, Theorem 3]).
6 The multiperiod case
Now suppose that the asset can be traded at the trading times 0, 1, . . . , T
The information is now modelled as a filtration i.e. an non-decreasing se-
quence of σ-algebras F := {Ft; t = 0, . . . , T} where Ft ⊆ F for all t. As
a convention we only consider filtrations with FT = F . A price process for
V is a collection S of RJ -valued F-measurable random variables S0, . . . , ST
such that ST = V.
We now redefine information structure to mean a set of filtrations (Hi). We
adapt the notions of symmetry, refinement and self-attainability by requiring
that these properties hold for (Hi,t) for any trading time.
Definition 6.1 (no-arbitrage price process, arbitrage-free filtration). The
price process S is a no-arbitrage price process for G and G is S-arbitrage-free
if for any t = 0, . . . , T − 1, St is a no-arbitrage price for St+1 and Gt. The
set of no-arbitrage price processes for G is denoted by S(G).
Remark 6.1. Suppose that the price process S is G-adapted. A trading
strategy or portfolio process for G is an RJ -valued process ξ := {ξ0, . . . , ξT }
that is G-predictable, i.e. ξ0 is constant and ξt is Gt−1 measurable for t ≥ 1.
A trading strategy is self-financing if
S⊤t (ξt+1 − ξt) = 0 a.s., t = 0, . . . , T − 1.
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According to standard theory a self-financing trading strategy is an arbitrage
(cf. e.g. [8, Definition 5.10]) if
S⊤0 ξ0 ≤ 0, V
⊤ξT ≥ 0 a.s., and P (V
⊤ξT > 0) > 0.
It is further proved ([8, Proposition 5.11]) that there exists an arbitrage
opportunity if and only if for some t there exists some Gt-measurable R
J -
valued η such that
S⊤t η ≤ 0, S
⊤
t+1η ≥ 0 a.s., and P (S
⊤
t+1η > 0) > 0.
Hence, by Remark 2.4, in the case of a G-adapted price process our notion
of arbitrage coincides with the standard definition.
Definition 6.2 (common no-arbitrage price process, arbitrage-free informa-
tion structure). A price process S is a common no-arbitrage price process
for (Hi) if it is a no-arbitrage price process for every Hi. The set of common
no arbitrage price processes for (Hi) is denoted by
Sc((Hi)) :=
⋂
S(Hi).
(Hi) is an arbitrage-free information structure if Sc((Hi)) 6= ∅.
The multiperiod version of the fundamental theorem of asset pricing (Corol-
lary 2.1.3) is:
Theorem 6.1. The price process S is a common no-arbitrage price process
for (Hi) if and only if at every ω ∈ Ω outside a set of measure 0, there exist
some collection of measures P (1), . . . , P (I) ∼ P such that
St
St
⊤z∗
(ω) = E(i)
[ St+1
St+1
⊤z∗
∣∣Hi,t](ω), i = 1, . . . , I, t = 0, . . . , T − 1.
As an immediate extension of Proposition 4.1 we have:
Proposition 6.1. Suppose that S ∈ S(F). Then, for any G ⊆ F there
exists a unique coarsest filtration G′ ⊇ G such that S ∈ S(F). This filtration
is referred to as the filtration revealed by S.
Definition 6.3. Suppose that the price process S is F-adapted and a no-
arbitrage price process for F. We say that the market {(Ω,F , P ), S,F} is
complete for G ⊆ F if at any trading time t and for every Ft-measurable
random variable X there exists some Gt−1-measurable z ∈ R
J such that
S⊤t z = X a.s.
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Remark 6.2. The classical definition of a complete multiperiod market is
that for every contingent F-claim X there exists some self-financing trading
strategy (cf Remark 6.1) such that
V ⊤ξT = F a.s.
(cf. e.g. [8, Defintion 5.37]). This is clearly the case if {(Ω,F , P ), S,F} is
complete for F. For the converse result, see e.g. [8, Theorem 5.40].
The multiperiod version of Proposition 3.2 is:
Proposition 6.2. Suppose that S is H-adapted. The following are equiva-
lent:
A. The market {(Ω,F , P ), S,H} is complete for G.
B. Any S-arbitrage-free information structure with Gi ⊇ G for all i is
symmetric.
Example 6.1 Consider a market with T = 2, I = 2, J = 2 and F and V as
in Example 3.1 and
H1 :=
{
{∅,Ω}, σ{F3}
}
, H2 :=
{
{∅,Ω}, {∅,Ω}
}
.
Then S is a common no-arbitrage price process if and only if it is of the
form
S0 :=
[
α
β
]
, S1 :=
[
a
b
]
χF1∪F2 + c
[
1
1
]
χF3,
with all constants strictly positive and a > b ⇔ α > β and a = b ⇔ α = β.
If a 6= b the market {(Ω,F , P ), S,H} is complete for H1, but not for H2.
The following example illustrates that we cannot establish the revealing
properties of a multiperiod information structure without taking prices into
account.
Example 6.2 Consider a market with T = 2, I = 2, J = 3, F and V as in
Example 2.1 and
H1 :=
{
σ{F4}, σ{F4}
}
, H2 :=
{
{∅,Ω}, σ{F3}
}
.
From the single period market we have that for any arbitrage-free refinement
we must have F3 ∈ G1,1 and S1 must be of the form
S1 :=

q1q2
0

χF1∪F2 +

 00
q3

χF3 +

 0q′2
0

χF4 ,
whith q1 ∈ R, the other constants positive and q2 > q1. If q1 = 0 the
information structure {
H1,0, σ{F3, F4}
}
, H2
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is arbitrage-free. If on the other hand q1 6= 0 we have to refine H1 as well
and {
H1,0, σ{F3, F4}
}
,
{
σ{F4}, H2,1
}
is the coarsest arbitrage-free refinement.
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